A judgment handed down on 16 July 2026 by the European Court of Human Rights in the case G.K. and A.S. v. Switzerland (applications no. 55299/20 and 31515/22) represents a milestone in extending the protection of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights to non-religious moral convictions.
The litigation originated from the claims of two Swiss citizens: G.K., held in pre-trial detention at Champ-Dollon prison (Geneva) on charges of criminal damage related to anti-speciesist activism, and A.S., compulsorily admitted to the psychiatric ward of the Lausanne University Hospital (CHUV).
Both complained that their meals had not been adapted to their vegan diet, followed for ethical reasons, and that there were no effective judicial remedies under Swiss law to challenge this discrimination.
The Court found both a violation of Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) and of Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Ethical veganism as a protected belief (Article 9 ECHR)
In order to determine the applicability of the Convention, the Court assessed whether ethical veganism could be classified as a belief rather than a mere dietary choice.
The Court confirmed that anti-speciesist philosophy, understood as the rejection of animal exploitation, meets the fundamental requirements for protection by satisfying the principles of:
- coherence and cohesion: abstaining from consuming animal-derived products is not an isolated practice, but logically stems from a structured system of thought that rejects the commodification of sentient beings.
- seriousness and importance: the applicants demonstrated an uncontested sincerity. In particular, for A.S., a practice spanning more than a decade confirmed that this choice represents an essential expression of his moral identity and philosophy of life.
The Court thus established that the applicants’ dietary choice is intimately linked to their ethical conscience, falling fully within the scope of protection of the freedom of thought guaranteed by the Convention.
Therefore, the State has a positive obligation to examine, within a clear legal framework, the substance of requests based on ethical veganism, whose dietary practice is protected on an equal footing with established religious dietary requirements.
The violation of Article 13: the problem of excessive formalism
The Court harshly criticised the approach taken by the Swiss authorities (the Administrative Chamber of the Geneva Court of Justice for G.K., the Vaud Cantonal Court for A.S. and, ultimately, the Federal Supreme Court), which had declared the applications inadmissible or rejected subsequent appeals, thereby preventing any examination of the merits.
The Swiss authorities created a genuine procedural “dead end” – an approach the Court deemed «excessively formalistic» – whereby the administrations responded to the applicants’ requests with simple letters instead of taking formal decisions, and the courts rejected the appeals precisely because such letters did not constitute challengeable decisions.
The Court concluded that the systematic dismissal of complaints based on procedural technicalities prevented any substantive analysis of the alleged infringement of individual freedom of conscience.
The State’s positive obligation and the margin of appreciation
The State has a positive obligation, namely to adopt active, reasonable and appropriate measures, to ensure that persons deprived of their liberty can manifest their beliefs.
Although the State enjoys a wide margin of appreciation, the Court noted that the applicants were entirely dependent on the authorities for the provision of food, over prolonged periods: a condition of “vulnerability and powerlessness” emphasised, in particular, by the second applicant in his submissions.
The margin of appreciation represents the discretionary space that the Court grants States in balancing individual interests against the organisational and financial constraints of public administrations.
This concept is rooted in the principle of subsidiarity, according to which the primary responsibility for guaranteeing rights lies with national authorities, and in the principle of proximity, which considers the State to be in the best position — being closer to the needs of citizens — to assess the country’s requirements.
In both cases addressed by the judgment, these principles were disregarded.
In the G.K. case, although the Government argued that only polenta and mashed potatoes were incompatible, the applicant demonstrated that many of the dishes served to him contained undeclared animal fats, eggs or dairy products. A.S., on the other hand, during isolation, had received meals «non-vegan, served by mistake» or lacking protein.
As stated by the applicant in his submissions, taken up by the Court, he «could not start eating until the nurses had received a response from the kitchen», with the result that the meals «often became cold», aggravating his psychological distress.
The Court did not, however, rule on the merits of the adequacy of the meals: the violation of Article 9 stems from the fact that the authorities failed to examine, within a clear legal framework, the serious and arguable complaints of the applicants.
International context and comparative law
The judgment fits within a framework of growing protection for veganism worldwide. The Court recognised not only that these cases do not concern religion but a deeply held conviction, but also that opposing the exploitation of sentient beings is an ethical stance, not a mere dietary preference.
Indeed, since the Government did not dispute their sincerity and coherence, the Court limited itself to assessing whether the applicants’ convictions were authentic, coherent and sufficiently serious to warrant protection, and concluded that they were.
The Court also referred to several precedents:
- Italy: the Bologna Court ruling (2020), which recognises a vegan diet as an expression of freedom of thought.
- Portugal: Law 11/2017, which requires animal-product-free options in all public canteens.
- Germany: reference to the case law of the MĂĽnster Administrative Court (2022), which classifies veganism as an ethically justified way of life.
- United Kingdom: the Casamitjana case (2020), which placed ethical veganism on equal footing with religions in terms of anti-discrimination protections.
The importance of the judgment for ethical dietary choices
This judgment represents a particularly important step because it addresses an area where, all too often, ethical and dietary choices are trivialised, reduced to personal preferences or treated as secondary needs, easily sacrificed in the face of organisational or bureaucratic reasons.
The Court, instead, restores order by clarifying that, when such choices stem from serious, coherent and deeply rooted convictions, they fall within the scope of freedom of thought and conscience and must be treated with the same respect owed to other protected beliefs. It is therefore not a matter of granting a favour or accommodating a mere individual request, but of ensuring that an ethical conviction is recognised as a relevant component of a person’s moral identity.
The ruling takes on particular significance in contexts where the individual depends on an institution for essential needs, such as food, care or continued presence within a public facility. In such cases, failure to recognise a deeply rooted ethical choice can translate into a concrete form of discrimination or exclusion, especially when the person has no realistic alternative to independently meet their needs.
The central point of the judgment is, indeed, precisely this: administrations cannot hide behind procedural formalism or merely interim responses to avoid examining, on the merits, requests based on ethical convictions. They must instead take such claims seriously, assess them substantively and, where possible, identify reasonable solutions that balance the needs of the individual with the organisational constraints of the institution.
Conclusions
This decision by the Court does not concern only the specific case of the two applicants, but helps to reinforce a broader principle: non-religious ethical convictions, when authentic, coherent and significantly affecting daily life, cannot be regarded as less deserving of protection than other philosophical or religious beliefs.
This is a step that helps overcome the marginalisation of those who make ethical choices that do not conform to the majority, and reaffirms that human dignity also depends on respect for one’s deepest convictions.
